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
Abstract 
This article explores mundane political agency. We introduce the notion of the political 
ordinary as agency based on the capacity of human beings to carry out acts that are 
undetermined and unexpected, and thus capable of challenging, opposing, negotiating, 
maintaining, and readjusting prevailing conditions. We approach subjectivity from a 
pragmatist and phenomenological point of view and argue that it is the condition of possibility 
of political agency. The paper demonstrates how political subjectivity can be located in the 
ways in which people take up issues that stand out as important to them. To this end we look 
into the everyday life experiences of an eleven-year-old girl whose struggles related to 
proposed subject positions provide examples of mundane political agency. We conclude by 
arguing that political agency is the subject’s action when in a state of becoming prompted by 
future-oriented demands and contingencies of social life. 
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subjectivity; the political; agency; temporality; attentiveness; everyday life 
  
3 
 
Onbecomingpolitical:Thepoliticalinsubjectivity
 
 
Introduction 
Political subjectivity is a notion that spans a vast conceptual space. Its perimeters range from 
a traditional search for the substantial subject of politics in entities such as the state, civic 
movements, or individuals, all the way to the total dissolution of the subject of politics in 
radical posthumanist philosophies. These two positions not only mark the opposite extremes 
in the understanding of the subject of politics, but they also represent two major impasses in 
attempts to theorize political subjectivity. Where the former fails to address the constitutive 
power that politics has on the subject, the latter runs at odds with intentionality as a practical 
and ethical facet of politics by expelling human subjectivity from political agency (Häkli 
2017; Prozorov, 2014; Rahimi, 2016; Schmidt, 2013). 
Seeking to move beyond both substantialist and anti-subjectivist ideas, a growing 
multidisciplinary literature has emerged to explore alternative views about the formation of 
political subjectivity. This work has been premised upon the idea that subjectivity should be 
seen “as more than a subsidiary effect, as more than the sum total of combined discursive 
positions”, and hence what is needed is “a new order of theorization, a new conceptualization 
of the subject” (Blackman et al, 2008, pp. 7–8). Building on a non-dualistic understanding of 
the subject, this scholarship has been fueled by the need to develop a better understanding of 
political agency and power relations, particularly in settings that are peripheral from the point 
of view of mainstream political analysis (e.g. Ataç et al, 2016; Boudreau et al, 2009; Isin, 
2009, 2012; Jarman et al, 2002). In consequence, also the ‘what’ of politics has been 
rethought, and the notion of the political has expanded to denote a broad spectrum of issues, 
events, sites and ways of acting, affecting and impacting. 
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Explorations into political subjectivity have re-animated classical questions on how to 
conceive of the subject and how human beings can theorize about themselves as acting agents 
(McNay, 2010). In the process, the term has gained multiple conceptual tones ranging from 
human experience to psychological processes and affective states, from constructions of 
selfhood to the constitution of the subject in relation to power and domination (Butler, 1997; 
Dikeç, 2013; Glynos and Stavrakakis, 2008; Isin, 2009; Ní Mhurchú, 2016). While the 
question of political subjectivity is, hence, embedded in various philosophical and theoretical 
positions, some common ground exists, such as the understanding that the self-controlled 
rational subject is a defunct notion, that subjectivity is at once deeply personal and 
fundamentally social, and that political subjectivities emerge through relational dynamics and 
exceed determination by power structures (e.g. Abrams, 2015; Blackman et al, 2008; Moon, 
2013; Walkerdine, 2015). 
One of the greatest challenges for theorizing political subjectivity from these starting 
points relates to the question of how to identify politics as it happens in the world. How do we 
know what is political for whom in the flux of everyday life, in its multilayered spatial and 
temporal complexities? By introducing the idea of ‘political ordinary’ this paper portrays 
political subjectivity as a dynamism whereby the political subject arises from and is 
constituted by everyday political agency. To this end we present a piece of analysis from our 
recent study with children whose subjective lifeworlds we have explored. The analysis mainly 
engages with the experiences of an eleven-year-old girl, Anna Lena. On this basis we discuss 
how subjectivity can, and as we argue, should be seen as the condition of possibility of 
mundane political agency. Our main purpose is to develop a deeper understanding of political 
subjectivity located in everyday experiences that are related to key moments of mundane 
politicization. To conclude we discuss what the analytical tools we propose may have to offer 
5 
 
to the contextual theorization of political subjectivity and theoretically informed empirical 
study of mundane political agency. 
 
Analyzing political subjectivity through children’s experiences 
As understood here, political subjectivity is not an age-specific matter and thus can be traced 
from children’s lives just as well as it can be located in the lives of adults. In fact, in our 
longstanding research with children and young people we have come across lives, events, 
situations, and narratives that are veritably filled with indications of mundane political agency 
(Kallio 2007; Kallio and Häkli 2011; Häkli and Kallio 2014). They reflect matters of 
importance, moments of interruption in life routines, attentiveness to situations characterized 
by the open-endedness and ambiguity over what transpires in the future, and engagement with 
things at stake that translate into certain acts in their everyday lives. Characteristic to these 
agencies is their seemingly non-political nature; in a traditional political analysis they would 
probably be considered rather insignificant. Yet, for our attempts to rethink the political 
subjectivities of everyday life, children’s lived worlds are particularly opportune precisely 
because they fall outside what is conventionally understood as political matters (on children’s 
politics, see Elwood and Mitchell 2012; Kallio and Häkli 2013; Marshall 2016; Skelton and 
Valentine 2003; Wood 2016). 
While children are in many ways similar political agents to adults, it is clear that their 
position as minors in society conditions their agencies in various ways (Kallio and Mills 
2016; Philo and Smith 2013). This needs to be kept in mind especially when discussing 
children’s mundane politics in different kinds of societal and cultural contexts (Beazley and 
Miller 2016; Habashi 2017). Yet, when focusing on children’s experiences and the 
subjectivities through which they become active agents in their everyday lives, their position 
as minors is but one contextual factor among others against which to negotiate their agencies. 
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For this reason our analysis does not pay particular attention to children’s minor position 
unless this comes to be reflected as part of an experience or subjective response that stands 
out as important to the child in question. 
The analysis draws upon our recent study with eleven-to-sixteen-year-old children and 
young people in settings where socio-economic, ethnic, or other differences are not 
particularly striking.1 Rather than concentrate on the everyday politics of school life, like 
many school ethnographic projects, this study sought to access our participants’ political 
agencies more broadly as experienced, developed and practiced in their lived worlds. The goal 
was to achieve a thick description of their experienced realities, accounts that we term 
dialogical place-based biographies (Kallio 2016). A major challenge in our field work, that we 
identified from early on, was accessing our participants’ political subjectivities as this 
dynamism cannot be engaged with directly. Arendt (1958, p.181) describes the difficulty of 
grasping subjective being as follows: “The moment we want to say who somebody is, our 
very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what he is”. Hence, mindful of this challenge, we 
set out to be sensitive to the modes in which our participants talked about themselves with 
reference to different identities, including articulated and bodily expressions as indications of 
their subjectivities at play in different situations (cf. Callaghan et al, 2016; Ehrkamp, 2013; 
Gökariksel, 2009).  
The following analysis is based on the biography of Anna Lena, one of the participants 
who we had an intense dialogue with.2 We do not take up her experiences due to their 
particularity – many of our participants shared with us events and situations foregrounding the 
aspect of being a particular kind of social self and how this varies in different contexts. What 
spoke to us in Anna Lena was her ability to make explicit some moments in which her sense 
of self was contested, both articulately and through embodied gestures (e.g. using different 
tones of voice, changes in bodily appearance). As Callaghan, Alexander and Fellin (2016, p. 
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411) note, “symbolically concatenated experiences […] are not easily expressible in words”, 
and hence attention to non-articulate forms of expression is important (see also Ivinson and 
Renold, 2013). In the following we let Anna Lena’s experiences portray the dynamism of 
political subjectivity and politicization in her everyday life.  
 
You can call me ”Annie”: The subject’s relative autonomy 
We got to know Anna Lena as an eleven-year-old girl living in a one-family house with her 
mother, little sister and a dog. Besides going to school and spending time with her friends, she 
likes to take the dog out and go to stables for horse riding. On a less cheerful note Anna Lena 
conveyed that her parents had recently divorced. It turned out that she and her sister visit their 
father and also their grandparents on a regular basis, and travel to meet up with other relatives 
during weekends and vacations. Anna Lena did not talk much about her performance in 
school but we understood that it is on good average level, and that she is more or less content 
with this. Hence, in most accounts we learned to know Anna Lena as an ”ordinary girl” in the 
cultural and socio-economic contexts of her everyday life. For a conventional political 
analysis this might suggest that her life is securely distant from things political. Yet, as will 
become apparent in the next two sections, she is actually very much involved in the mundane 
politics of her everyday life. 
In our first discussion with her, Anna Lena chose to walk us through her lived world, 
telling about her home, daycare, hobby, and school life. She had moved to her present 
neighborhood and joined her school class as a second-grader, ending up as a newcomer in a 
class that had all been together since kindergarten. On her first day at school her new 
classmates asked what to call her, and without much thinking Anna Lena had said ”Annie”. 
This was a nickname that her nanny had coined when she was about five years old and used 
only by her until Anna Lena took it up in the new school. She went on to note that usually she 
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was called ”Lena”: ”At home I’m always Lena, and have always been, and at school I’m 
Annie”. So we learned that Anna Lena uses her given name in official situations and with 
strangers, ”Annie” at school and with new friends, and ”Lena” in her family and with friends 
from years before the present school. 
After getting to know Anna Lena better we realized that she was well versed in moving 
between her different social selves, and that through her nicknames she was actually 
articulating different identity constructions. She could reflect on their distinct character and 
activities, for instance by stating ”Annie might go and lay down in a puddle but Lena could 
never do that”. We read this reflection as illuminative of Anna Lena’s subjectivity involving 
the experience of a distinction between her sense of self and identities. We therefore took it as 
an entry point for exploring her capacity to problematize experience related to proposed 
subject positions (see also Nicolaisen, 1999; Kim and Lee, 2011).  
During our discussions Anna Lena indicated various ways in which she positions 
herself and acts through the provided subject positions. These practices range from caring 
relationships to caution in risk taking to struggling with family strains to challenging adult 
authority, involving matters and unfolding in situations where she has things at stake. We read 
these as instances where Anna Lena is prompted to negotiate her identities in her everyday 
life. The next section presents one example of how her political subjectivity gained 
momentum as she challenged her familial subject positions.  
 
Subjective positioning in a familial struggle 
”Our parents usually take us [to the Granny’s], me and my sister, when 
they need to work extra time, or we take a bus, and then we stay there for 
some time. […] Granny makes good food, and she is fun and has lots of 
different hobby stuff, and she has this nice cat, old and chubby but 
anyways […] and Grandpa is kind though he’s like over seventy – he 
always asks what we kids would like to do, and even if we’ve been to the 
Granny’s the whole day he still wants to cook us a proper meal.” (Anna 
Lena) 
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During our dialogue Anna Lena was very keen on talking about her family relationships. The 
above excerpt introduces two persons who have a special place in her life: the paternal 
grandparents who have taken care of her and her sister throughout their childhood. In addition 
to such happy memories and caring relations, we learned that she had encountered 
contradictory expectations and demands with them, particularly her Granny. Anna Lena’s 
openness about the growing strain in these relationships suggested to us that they form an 
important facet of her life.  
In discussing her grandparents Anna Lena was always careful to indicate that, for her, the 
positive experiences outweigh the negative ones. For example when talking about her 
relationship with ”Granny”, she first noted that she and ”Grandpa” had divorced well before 
she was born but this had not prevented them from helping Anna Lena’s parents with child 
care. In fact, the paternal grandparents live close to each other, and the sisters often stay either 
with Granny or Grandpa when their parents have long hours at work, coming and going 
between the two houses more or less as they please.  
However, Anna Lena added that for a couple of years she had been experiencing 
uncomfortable feelings at Granny’s place. We understood that these feelings were largely due 
to Granny’s increasingly pronounced opinion that she was being neglected by Anna Lena’s 
parents, and that they had developed a pattern of similar situations with some other close 
relatives. Anna Lena told us that she was sad and anxious because Granny had started to 
convey these familial strains openly to her, blaming her too for taking Grandpa’s side in their 
decades-long opposition. Anna recalled vividly Granny’s dissatisfaction with her parents: 
”[Granny] then said that ‘they have estranged many important people from around you; your 
[maternal] Grandfather is alone dying from sorrow, and his wife is dying from sorrow, and 
Granny is dying from sorrow, and you too are abandoning me now’ […]” 
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Adding to the complexity of the situation, Anna Lena conveyed to us that she and her 
sister get along very well with their Grandpa. She described at length how, when staying at 
his place, Grandpa takes good care of them and organizes fun activities, but also allows the 
girls themselves to decide what they want to do. This includes that they are always allowed to 
spend time also with Granny if they wish. We began to fully grasp the challenges Anna Lena 
was facing in her familial life when she took up her parents’ position in the situation. With 
some frustration she declared that currently her mother and father find Granny unstable, and 
added that her parents and other paternal relatives are in fact no longer in contact with the 
embittered Granny: ”They said ‘we’ve about had it with Granny’.” Hence, it turned out that 
while Anna Lena enjoys a considerable flexibility in visiting her grandparents, the flipside is 
that she has found herself in a most awkward position as an arbitrator between her parents, 
Grandpa and Granny (a situation not uncommon in post-divorce families; Haugen, 2007).  
When we asked Anna Lena how she feels about the situation she stated that she likes to 
visit the Granny but often feels guilty about not spending enough time with her. We also 
learned that she was rather uncomfortable with having to please both her parents and her 
grandparents, and that she had thought about changing the situation either by being more 
agreeable with Granny or visiting her less often. 
 
Interviewer: ”Who gets to decide on whether you visit her or not?” 
Anna Lena: ”Well, I can decide that on my own.” 
Interviewer: ”Ok, I see.” 
Anna Lena: ”It’s too bad really, because I’d like to go there but then if 
I don’t visit her for a couple of days it automatically means that we’ve 
abandoned her.” 
Interviewer: ”Right.” 
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Anna Lena: ”So, in the end I don’t want to go there. Either I should 
spend all my time there or not go at all – it’s kinda annoying, you 
know.” 
Interviewer: ”Have you ever tried to make her see things differently?” 
Anna Lena: ”Sure, like this one time when she said that you can decide 
yourself whether to visit me or not, and when you don’t come I know 
you don’t want to.” 
Interviewer: ”So, did you then say something to her?” 
Anna Lena: ”Well, I said something like ‘I really want to come but 
sometimes just can’t make it’, to which she said that Granny is not so 
stupid as to believe that.” 
 
When describing her difficult experiences with the situation, Anna Lena was tensioned and 
spoke breathlessly. Hence, we were struck with the change in her being when she took up her 
affectionate relationship with Granny: ”She is like a really very pleasant person, real nice in 
other ways […] she is pleasant and she has a nice garden and everything, but when she starts 
the blaming again then it’s really drab, and there’s like nothing that would make her stop.” 
Similar bodily gestures that occurred throughout our discussions testified that to Anna Lena 
Granny was a very close, even if controversial, family member. 
However, we also understood that to Anna Lena the strength on this relationship had 
developed into a double-edged sword. She told us that with her little sister she was the only 
remaining relative still keeping in touch with Granny. In this situation she could not help 
feeling that Granny had fastened onto her as a kind of a co-victim in the game ruled by the 
generation in between them: ”[Granny] then said that ‘it is so agonizing when your own 
children abandon you, so don’t you just ever abandon your own parents’.” On top of this her 
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parents, for their part, blame Granny’s ‘condition’ for the whole situation, thus deepening the 
cleavage between themselves, Anna Lena and Granny: ”Mom said this is enough, that she is 
getting so crazy that soon she won’t let us visit her anymore.” Finally, Grandpa’s care for the 
girls feels particularly affectionate to Anna Lena, as he has not put pressure on her but instead 
allows her to choose for herself how to keep up the intergenerational relations in the difficult 
situation: ”Grandpa is so lovely, he’s turning seventy one this year, and he’s just so nice and 
fair.” 
We learned that in the midst of this discord, Anna Lena’s experience of her familial 
relationships had problematized to the point where she had become attentive to several 
aspects of the crisis. In upholding the contested family relationships, Anna Lena found herself 
as an arbitrator between Granny and Grandpa: ”We’d been at Granny’s for three days, and 
then with Grandpa for two days, and when we then went to see Granny again she said that 
Grandpa just tries to keep you busy so that you couldn’t get here […]” Moreover, Anna Lena 
has a major role in either continuing or reversing the intergenerational fragmentation of her 
family because she and her little sister are the only persons who are in communicative 
relationships with all parties of the family situation, including her parents, herself and her 
sister, her paternal and maternal grandparents, and indirectly also some other close relatives. 
Above we have examined these familial relations as they are reflected in Anna Lena’s 
dialogical biography. We now move into discussing her experiences and actions in terms of 
what we call the political ordinary.3 
 
The idea of ‘political ordinary’  
As the above discussion shows, the question of Anna Lena’s subjectivity is closely related 
with the phenomenologies of her agency (see also Abrams 2015; Barnett, 2012). To focus on 
the phenomenology4 of human agency has particular appeal when it comes to making sense of 
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the politics of everyday life (Knies, 2001; Melançon, 2010). It conveys the idea that we 
should not preclude seemingly commonplace, uninteresting or unremarkable events from the 
analysis of political agency, as these too may be significant for the ones involved. The 
phenomenological apprehension of mundane agency thus opens up for the possibility of 
studying the politics of “living together” as it unfolds in the world (Arendt 2005, p. 21). 
The idea of ‘political ordinary’ may at first glance seem antithetical to the conventional 
understanding of politics as matters of particular import. However, at stake with the notion of 
ordinary is not importance per se, but rather the way in which, and by whom, this importance 
is recognized. This is precisely where the phenomenology of everyday life comes into play; it 
allows for an understanding of politics where the significance and importance of issues is an 
emergent part of everyday experience, not a pre-given fact. This is not to say that the 
experiencing subject is a static substance in itself, or that the political ordinary only occurs 
through people’s immediate encounters (see also Bleiker, 2003; Callaghan et al, 2016; 
Ivinson and Renold, 2013). On the contrary, present social existence is always intersubjective 
and as contextually embedded it has a history and a future (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; 
Rahimi 2016). These socio-spatial and temporal conditions of subjective experience 
effectively enmesh the emergent political ordinary with collective and institutional politics to 
the point where the distinction may become meaningless (e.g. Bayat, 2010; Thomas, 2011). 
Politics, thus understood, is a manifestly human condition, a ceaseless negotiation of the ways 
of living together that employs the capacities for human agency, such as attentiveness, 
reflexivity, affectivity, improvisation, interrogation, and the production of change (cf. Isin, 
2009; McNay, 2008; Simonsen, 2013). 
Viewing people’s mundane life as potentially political requires some qualifications to 
justify the use of the term political instead of, say, social co-existence. When discussing Anna 
Lena’s biography, we have already pointed at matters of importance as key in recognizing the 
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political moment in everyday life. In a phenomenological perspective, the importance of 
issues can only be judged by the subjects involved. Moreover, importance is not an inherent 
aspect of issues but is constituted contextually, which means that the political always needs a 
setting where those involved have things at stake (Kallio and Häkli 2017). Recognizing the 
constitutive role of contextuality in mundane politics means that it cannot be understood in 
individualistic terms. As political agents we exist intersubjectively, share our experiences 
intuitively or deliberately, enact and debate norms and moralities collectively, and articulate 
our concerns in socially meaningful ways. 
What follows is that to grasp how political agency is constituted, it is necessary to turn 
to people’s experiences of events and situations they encounter, and focus on issues that stand 
out as important to them. To this end we must account for a key capacity of human subjects, 
which is to experience a distance between their intersubjectively negotiated social identities 
and their own sense of self, that is, a relative autonomy from the subject positions offered in 
the flux of everyday life (e.g. raced, classed, gendered, aged, familial identities) (Häkli & 
Kallio 2014, see also Walkerdine, 2000). The political ordinary, thus, is “exerted through 
moves that are imbricated with discourses of power but also recognize and question them“ 
(Zanotti, 2013, p. 298). It is animated when people become attentive to social power relations 
embedded in particular subject positions that they end up accepting, averting or transforming. 
The baseline that follows is that subjectivity is both the premise of and constraint to human 
political agency, thus forming its critical condition of possibility. 
This subjective dynamism was clearly present also in Anna Lena’s life. Her long-
standing attempts to maintain good relationships with both her parents and her grandparents 
have required constant balancing between their and her own aspirations. While she has grown 
somewhat tired of the strained situation, she has chosen to diverge from her parents and the 
broader family who have let their relationship with Granny to thin out. By continuing to visit 
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her Granny, she has effectively maintained the intergenerational problematic on the family 
agenda. However, at the same time she has refused the subject position of ‘Granny’s girl’, a 
familial role whereby she would end up taking sides with her (and other ‘abandoned’ 
grandparents from the mother’s side), in opposition to her parents, her Grandpa, and the rest 
of the father’s family. Hence, her agency is not that of an individual subject, but builds on her 
political subjectivity and personal experiences that are heavily conditioned by the social 
settings and contexts of her everyday life. 
Yet, importantly, Anna Lena’s political subjectivity is not reducible to these formative 
conditions and contexts. To make sense of the subject’s relative autonomy from its social 
constitution, we have followed ideas developed in classical pragmatist thought (most 
importantly G.H. Mead’s work) and the subsequent scholarship it has inspired (e.g. 
Colapietro, 2006; Honneth, 1995). We have found useful a Meadian understanding of 
subjectivity as a dialogue between the subject’s ”me” and ”I”; two aspects of subjective 
existence that can only be distinguished analytically (Mead, 1934). Here ”me” refers to the 
subject’s intersubjectively constituted social self that acts as a kind of an ”interface” in our 
encounters with others. ”I”, instead, refers to the embodied subject’s presently ongoing 
agency that is always facing situations that are novel (in the sense of not being predetermined) 
(Markell 2007). Subjectivity, then, dwells in the irreducibility of our sense of self to our social 
constitution – a distance that provides us with the capacity to experience subject positions 
proposed to us as more or less agreeable (cf. “construction of a sense of self-as-subject”, 
Callaghan et al, 2016, p. 415). 
We argue that this experiential capacity, enabled by subjectivity, is what fundamentally 
animates the political ordinary. In Anna Lena’s case, to avert an uncomfortable subject 
position, she obtained degrees of freedom in her relationship with Granny by refusing to 
become a ‘Granny’s girl’. In practical terms, she does not visit her every time she has the 
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chance, and simply leaves from her place when the conditions there turn agonizing: ”I still 
like to visit Granny but sometimes I leave for the Grandpa’s instead […] and when Granny 
wants me to spend all my time there, then I just don’t go […]” In so doing, she is having her 
way without having to choose sides. These subtle deeds, at once purposive and disruptive of 
the prevailing routines, are precisely what Isin (2012, p. 123) calls an act, a mark of ”political 
subjectivity” at play (emphasis in original). They are, however, not proposing a rupture, a 
transgressive move that would lead to radical change, but rather are oriented toward 
maintaining the status quo that Anna Lena finds worth protecting. 
We posit that paying attention to experiences of subject positions people encounter in 
their lives is key to recognizing and studying the moments that give rise to the political in 
everyday life (cf. Barnett, 2012; Isin, 2012; Dawney, 2013). As Anna Lena’s biography 
shows, in empirical terms it is feasible to focus on people’s experiences of being particular 
kinds of social selves, as these vary between contexts (e.g. ”me” in the family setting, at work, 
in public, in nursing and health care institutions, etc.). While people do not continuously 
reflect upon their sense of self, experiences of unease or gratification may increase such 
attentiveness to the point where it becomes the object of explicit reflection. In such instances 
the different facets of ”me” – the identities through which we relate with our worlds – can be 
assessed, discussed and affected by ourselves and others. 
 
Becoming/political: temporality, attentiveness, agency 
We are yet to arrive at a more focused understanding of what constitutes the political in the 
flux of everyday life, distinguishing it from other facets of socio-spatially conditioned human 
agency. In this regard we have found helpful Sadeq Rahimi’s (2016) recent discussion on the 
coming together of different temporal dimensions of subjective experience (see also 
Walkerdine, 2015). Here we elaborate Rahimi’s idea of pantemporality further with the help 
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of Mustafa Emirbayer and Ann Mische’s (1998) thorough assessment of the relationship 
between temporality, the subject’s experience and some key dimensions of human agency. 
Leaning on Mead’s (1932) thought on the temporal conditions of human agency, they 
distinguish between the past, the present and the future as the three major orientations that 
shape agency. Mindful of the risks of categorical thinking, they are careful to stress that the 
distinction is analytical and that in any empirical agency usually all three are present to some 
extent. They still point out that one of the temporalities often predominates, thus giving rise to 
qualitative differences in the nature of human agency depending on whether it is enacting the 
past or rather orientated to the future as it seeks to respond to emergent events (Emirbayer and 
Mische, 1998).  
Emirbayer and Mische (1998) characterize the three constitutive temporalities in terms 
of iterational (the past), projective (the future) and practical–evaluative (the present) agency. 
Here the iterational element refers to the ways in which the past conditions human agency 
through the ”interpenetration of mental categories, embodied practices and social 
organization” that make it possible for humans to ”sustain identities, meanings and 
interactions […] recursively implemented in social life”. Hence, iterational agency involves 
largely ”habitual, unreflected, and mostly unproblematic patterns of action by means of which 
we orient our efforts in the greater part of our daily lives” (1998, p. 975). In agreement with 
this characterization we see iterational agency, conditioned by past socio-spatial contexts, as 
the ‘non-political’ major part of the flux of our everyday lives.  
The idea of past as iterational routine differs crucially from the more conventional 
understanding of past as history. History as transmitted memories and past experiences carries 
a strong political potential when enlivened and mobilized in the context of present actions 
(Mitchell and Elwood, 2013). It is therefore important to remember that the past, in the sense 
that Emirbayer and Mische (1998) talk about it, refers simply to the fact that we are not 
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constantly alerted to reflection or attentiveness to our situations, but instead carry with us 
habitual ways of being and relating with others. In contrast to this, when articulated in some 
form that people can become aware of and affected by, the past as history may gain political 
momentum. To use a Hegelian example, it is possible to lead a ‘non-political’ life as a slave if 
this is a routinely enacted position and identity to the person involved, but politics may begin 
when the person becomes aware of the ancestry of slavery. In our broader study, examples of 
such transitions included awakening to racist undertones of bullying in school, and the 
realization that difficulties to progress in education are related to socio-economic inequalities 
embedded in the UK school system (Kallio 2017). 
In stark contrast to the stable and routine-like iteration, projectivity encompasses the 
ways in which humans creatively reconfigure ”received structures of thought and action [… in 
relation to their] hopes, fears, and desires for the future” (1998, p. 971). Projective agency is 
shaped in response to the challenges of social life caused by uncertainty regarding some 
aspects of the future. Emirbayer and Mische (1998) posit that by generating alternative 
possible responses to the problematic situations they confront in their lives, humans 
”construct changing images of where they think they are going, where they want to go, and 
how they can get there from where they are at present” (1998, p. 971). Far from a voluntarist 
conception of fully informed individual strategic action, projective agency ”is always an 
interactive, culturally embedded process by which social actors negotiate their paths toward 
the future, receiving their driving impetus from the conflicts and challenges of social life.” 
(1998, p. 971).  
Hence, awareness of history and the long-term formation of constraints may well be part 
of projectivity as long as these are problematized in the context of future-oriented agency (see 
also Kojéve, 1969; Rahimi, 2016). Moreover, such agency is informed by ”varying degrees of 
clarity and detail and extend with greater or lesser reach into the future; they entail proposed 
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interventions at diverse and intersecting levels of social life” (1998, p. 971). Projectivity thus 
involves a form of reflexivity and aspiring imagination to the extent that it is prompted by 
”problems that cannot satisfactorily be resolved by the taken-for-granted habits of thought and 
action that characterize the background structure of the social world” (1998, p. 984).  
It is the future-oriented projectivity that for us sets political agency apart from other 
forms of social co-existence and interaction. Its condition of possibility lies in the human 
capacity to political subjectivity and experiential distanciation from proposed subject 
positions. In Mead’s (1934) terms projectivity is based on subjective freedom and 
maneuverability in relation to established roles, that is, the imaginative capacity of the 
situational ”I” to exist in relation to a contextually variable ”me”. This maneuverability 
enables the subject to act in unexpected ways and initiate things new in response to challenges 
set by one or another aspect of the uncertain future.  
But what is it that prompts political agency? To account for this question we must turn 
to the third temporal orientation shaping human agency. The practical–evaluative aspect of 
agency entails responsiveness to ”the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of 
presently evolving situations” (Emirbayer and Mische, 1998, p. 971). Key here is the 
problematization of experience that brings about a moment of attentiveness toward an 
emergent situation, or ”interruption” in the flux of mundane routines (Dawney, 2013). 
Attentiveness calls forth a deliberation that can be either situationally based or embedded in a 
broader spatio-temporal context, and conducive to either reproductive or transformative 
action. Hence, attentiveness may range from a clear-cut disruptive experience to an extended 
feeling of unease with some aspects of one’s life. Importantly, when an emergent situation 
prompts attentiveness, humans are pushed away from their iterative forms of agency, into a 
state of becoming where the past and the future intersect in the form of a challenge, 
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uncertainty, or conflict that demands their attention. By definition, such attentiveness is 
prompted by matters of importance, a challenge in which the subject has something at stake. 
 In terms of our conceptual approach, we found Anna Lena’s positioning in her 
tensioned family relations an apt example of how the past and the future entwine in the 
political ordinary. Anna Lena is engaged in the situation as a subject whose life routines with 
the grandparents have been problematized. Her agency is prompted by the demands and 
contingencies of her familial life, weaving together her parents’ and grandparents’ homes as 
its key sites, and past rifts and omissions as its focal events. It is also characterized by 
considerable uncertainty and ambiguity in regard how these relationships will evolve in the 
future and who Anna Lena can be in her family. A degree of autonomy from roles and 
expectations spring from Anna Lena’s subjectivity, allowing her to break away from routines, 
and thereby take action not determined by past events. Yet, they continue to condition her 
political agency as she needs to position herself in relation to what has transpired in her 
extended familial relations over the past years. 
 
State of becoming as the political moment  
The multiple spatial and temporal dimensions, along which the subject’s attentiveness may be 
prompted, point at a complex and multifaceted contextuality of the political ordinary. 
Immediate situations may be powerfully affective, bringing about a bodily felt disruption in 
the flux of personal routines (Koefoed and Simonsen, 2012). For example, several participants 
in our broader study recalled strong emotions and anxiety from encountering poor and 
vulnerable people living on the street in countries like Egypt, South Africa and India. While 
exposed to poverty and inequality through education and the news and popular media, facing 
these people had struck them in ways that go beyond such cognitive processing.  
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Yet, often the present situation is more broadly constituted and thus reflects a bundle of 
spatio-temporal relations that bring together various events, actors, sites and places. In such a 
case the problematization of experience may extend well beyond a momentarily interruption, 
coming closer to the idea of a problem or crisis in everyday life that demands more sustained 
attention and involves sharing with other people (e.g. Secor, 2002; Thomas, 2011). In our 
reading, this is precisely how Anna Lena’s political agency is constituted in the context of her 
familial relations. Her acts, animated by subjectivity and raised by attentiveness toward 
problematized experiences, are prompted by the contingencies of the present as she is drawing 
from the past and orienting toward an unknown future. In other words, this is how Anna 
Lena’s pantemporal political ordinary is shaping both herself and the situations where she has 
things at stake.  
It is the responses to these kinds of challenges that we wish to term mundane political 
agency because they entail a purposive action to either restore the possibility to reproductive 
agency, or to invent transformative forms of action. Political agency, thus understood, is the 
subject’s action when in a ‘state of becoming’ prompted by the future-oriented demands and 
contingencies of social life, and characterized by the exigencies of changing situations with 
considerable uncertainty and ambiguity. This agency may take different forms because 
activity and passivity are equally possible responses – not taking progressive action may also 
be an act – and humans may seek to either restore the status quo or produce change in those 
aspects of their lives that have become problematized.  
In sum, for agency to be political it has to be distinguishable from action performed in 
accordance with a social order understood as conduct, discipline, practice or routine. 
Moreover, political agency is always purposive (albeit not necessarily intentional) and thus 
involves an accomplishment in the sense of having completion. Hence, ”to make a difference 
is to act; to act is to make a difference” (Isin, 2009, p. 380). However, we insist that politics 
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must not always be seen as a rupture or a turn towards change. It seems clear to us that to 
purposively maintain a status quo by sustaining a prevalent order or halting change can be just 
as significant a way of being political as is to act subversively. Instead of disruption the key to 
the political ordinary is in the future-oriented responsiveness to a situation based on 
attentiveness to power relations vested in subject positions encountered in everyday life. 
Based on the subject’s relative autonomy, we argue, this capacity is at the root of 
becoming/political.  
 
Conclusion 
In this article we argue for the inclusion of ordinary acts within what is conceived of as the 
political. We do this to decenter the idea that political subjectivities mainly dwell in the realm 
where matters of public import are dealt with. We consider that it is useful to become more 
attuned to the plurality of political acts by recognizing that the political exists in the capacities 
that all human beings have, and by accepting that struggles identifiable as political deeply 
intertwine with the seemingly non-political ordinary aspects of life. 
It is this plurality of political acts that we seek to capture with the concept of the 
political ordinary. The political aspects of everyday life, such as being socially related through 
our raced, gendered, sexed, classed, aged, and placed identities, are never purely about social 
power structures operating over and above our heads, but rather they are shaped through 
negotiations and struggles that constitute human existence at its most persistent and common 
levels. We share Thomas Dumm’s (1999, p. 5) conviction that ”a better understanding of the 
ordinary may lead to a better apprehension of some of the most important political struggles 
of this era”. We only need to think of modern gay and lesbian movements to realize that most 
intimately experienced matters of importance may translate into acts that accumulate and 
explode into politics that nearly everyone has to relate to (Blackman et al, 2008; Ruez, 2016; 
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Seidman and Meeks, 2011). Or we can point at intergenerational caring relations that 
currently are strained by the fragmentation of families, individuated lifestyles and 
transnational mobility, yet keep animating the ordinary politics of care, as was the case in 
Anna Lena’s life (Blome et al, 2009; Kallio 2016). Acknowledging the agencies of children 
and young people, and others typically excluded from the realm of politics, is an important 
aspect in this reading of the political (cf. Callaghan et al, 2016; Ivinson and Renold, 2013).  
Drawing from our empirical study with children, we have sought to demonstrate how 
human subjects relate with their worlds through social identities from which they have a 
relative autonomy. The irreducibility of the subject to its intersubjective constitution is the 
basis of subjectivity that we approach as the sine qua non of becoming political. Leaning on 
Georg Herbert Mead’s and Hannah Arendt’s thought, we suggest that, while we can 
understand our different identities as the general attributes that delineate what we are, the 
human ability to experience a relation to these subject positions – either accepting, averting or 
renegotiating them – animates our political subjectivities and gives rise to what we refer to as 
the political ordinary. Our analysis shows how this subjectivity can be studied by assessing 
experiences of situations and events that make the subjects attentive to power relations vested 
in the subject positions that are offered to them in their everyday life. In the presented case, 
acting as differently named social selves provides an entry point to grasping this dynamic. In 
discussions with Anna Lena we were able to enter some lived moments and situations where 
she employed capacities animated by her subjectivity. Her attentiveness was prompted by 
aspects of close relationships in which she had things at stake, and she acted politically in 
response to these challenges together with her significant others. These aspects of Anna 
Lena’s life we read as evidence of her subjectivity and agency unfolding in the political 
ordinary. 
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We consider political agency as the subject’s action when in a state of becoming 
prompted by future-oriented demands and contingencies of social life. In the political moment 
people therefore appear simultaneously as acting and developing subjects. As experientially 
grounded in the flux of everyday life, political acts can concern anything that human subjects 
become attentive to, with the potential of maintaining, challenging, and transforming the 
conditions from which they spring. When analyzed in situations where people have things at 
stake, the different spatio-temporal modalities of the political intersect and enmesh, dissolving 
categorical distinctions between the past, present and future, as well as private and public, or 
personal and institutional contexts of politicization. The challenges that this line of inquiry 
presents, we trust, will intrigue scholars interested in deepening our understanding of political 
subjectivity as a mundane human condition. 
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1 The field work involved 162 participants from Southern Finland and Northern England and was carried out 
with anthropologically oriented child–centered methods, respecting children and young people’s right to decide 
the extent to which they wished to participate in our research, if at all. 
2 All names we refer to are pseudonyms and the specifics concerning the field work setting have been removed. 
We use throughout the name Anna Lena to refer to our participant’s given name, and Annie and Lena to refer to 
her nicknames. 
3 The following analysis has close parallels with the analyses by Callaghan et al (2016), and Ivinson and Renold 
(2013). While not discussing political subjectivities or agency per se, we see the situations and activities they 
describe as apt examples of political ordinary unfolding in children’s and young people’s distinct mundane 
contexts. 
4 We refer to phenomenology not as a school of thought but as a particular perspective that highlights human 
experience at the root of political agency. 
                                               
